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ABSTRACT
Tomake evidence-based recommendations to decision-makers,
researchers conducting systematic reviews andmeta-analyses
must navigate a garden of forking paths: a series of analytical
decision-points, each of which has the potential to influence
findings. To identify challenges and opportunities related to
designing systems to help researchers manage uncertainty
around which of multiple analyses is best, we interviewed
11 professional researchers who conduct research synthe-
sis to inform decision-making within three organizations.
We conducted a qualitative analysis identifying 480 analyt-
ical decisions made by researchers throughout the scien-
tific process. We present descriptions of current practices in
applied research synthesis and corresponding design chal-
lenges: making it more feasible for researchers to try and
compare analyses, shifting researchers’ attention from ratio-
nales for decisions to impacts on results, and supporting com-
munication techniques that acknowledge decision-makers’
aversions to uncertainty. We identify opportunities to design
systems which help researchers explore, reason about, and
communicate uncertainty in decision-making about possible
analyses in research synthesis.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→ Decision support systems; •
Human-centered computing → Visualization theory,
concepts and paradigms.
KEYWORDS
Representing Uncertainty, Research Synthesis
1 INTRODUCTION
Organizations routinely rely on prepared summaries of em-
pirical evidence to support decision-making. For example,
the Navy employs scientists who review scientific literature
and collect data internally in order to recommend improve-
ments in training practices. Similarly, Veterans’ Affairs em-
ploys researchers who meta-analyze the scientific literature
on treatments for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
other conditions in order to recommend the best possible
treatment options for veterans struggling with trauma.
When compiling and communicating a summary of sci-
entific evidence, researchers make a series of analytical de-
cisions such as how to combine information from studies
conducted with different measures or in different settings.
Recent work in reproducible statistics [64, 65, 67, 69, 77],
driven by concerns about a “replication crisis”, demonstrates
how flexibility in decision-making produces multiple pos-
sible sequences of analytical decisions, which an analyst
chooses between at their discretion. In the context of re-
search synthesis, alternative possible analyses may lead to
alternative understandings of empirical evidence and conse-
quently, opposite or inconclusive recommendations. Faced
with a “garden of forking paths” [26], researchers cannot
eliminate subjectivity and uncertainty from the scientific
process. Instead, scholars suggest that researchers should
attempt to understand which analytical decisions impact
results [67, 69].
By identifying researcher degrees of freedom [77] as a
cause of the “replication crisis”, prior work seems to focus
blame on the indiscretions of individual researchers. How-
ever, with existing software to tools, it is difficult for re-
searchers to deliberate about and explore the consequences
of alternative analyses (e.g., [67, 69]), such that even re-
searchers with honest intentions may struggle to perceive
the implications of different choices. In this study, we seek an
in-depth understanding of how researchers make analytical
decisions in research synthesis, and where they struggle with
uncertainty in the process, in order to identify opportunities
to design for decision-making in the garden of forking paths.
We contribute the results of a qualitative analysis of open-
ended conversational interviews we conducted with 11 re-
searchers who work to support evidence-based decision-
making at three institutions: the Navy, the Medical Center
at a large public university, and the Veterans’ Affairs Medi-
cal Center in a major US city. In our interviews we elicited
detailed descriptions of experiences conducting scientific
review and analysis, emphasizing the reasoning behind an-
alytical decisions and the strategies that researchers use to
manage uncertainty. Based on these interviews, we identify
a set of challenges around managing uncertainty in research
synthesis: the tension between surveying analysis paths and
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implementing a specific path, the disconnect between re-
searchers’ rationales for analytical decisions and the actual
impact of those decisions on findings, and the balance be-
tween researchers’ skepticism and the need for compelling
recommendations. We draw on utility theory [75] and prior
work on reliable statistics and uncertainty visualization, in
combination with our interviews, to identify opportunities
to address these challenges by designing systems which en-
courage exploration of alternative analyses, elicit and repre-
sent researchers’ reasoning about analytical decisions, and
provide researchers with techniques to communicate uncer-
tainty in the research process.
2 BACKGROUND
Managing Uncertainty in Decision-Making
A large body of research on judgment and decision-making
(JDM) has examined how people reason with and make deci-
sions under uncertainty. Canonical work by Tversky and Kah-
neman [37, 73] established that people often seek to reduce
uncertainty, sometimes by substituting heuristic judgments
for more complex reasoning. A drive to reduce uncertainty
can lead to unwarranted expressions of certainty [52], which
has consequences for decision-making individually and at
an organizational level (e.g., in public policy).
Decision-making under uncertainty is characterized by
feelings of conflict and doubt which block or delay a choice
between alternative courses of action [55]. As such uncer-
tainty is broadly defined and associated with a variety of
terms [10, 47] such as ambiguity [32, 54], risk [1, 3, 49], unre-
liability, imprecision, incompleteness, and contradiction [44],
as well as error and subjectivity [50]. Based on a literature
review of work describing real world decision-making under
varying forms of uncertainty, Lipshitz and Strauss [47] devel-
oped a framework for understanding how decision-makers
in organizations like the military cope with uncertainty. In
their framework uncertainty is either acknowledged through
preemptive action and planning, reduced through rule- or
assumption-based reasoning, or suppressed through ignor-
ing information or guesswork. We borrow these strategies
from Lipshitz and Strauss to characterize analytical decisions
described by our participants during interviews.
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis
Systematic review andmeta-analysis are methodologies used
to produce a rigorous summary of existing evidence on a
topic. Using systematic review, researchers account for sci-
entific literature within a consistent framework and char-
acterize the research to date on a particular topic [58]. As
an extension of systematic review, researchers sometimes
choose to aggregate quantitative results from studies through
a meta-analysis [17, 46, 58]. Meta-analysis produces an esti-
mate of the effect size of an intervention by pooling statistical
outcomes from studies conducted under similar conditions.
Ideally, when prescribed procedures are followed, system-
atic review and meta-analysis offer more robust findings 1
than regular literature review and quantitative analysis, re-
spectively [58]. A typical systematic review starts with a
question about the effect of some intervention and database
queries to find all the relevant literature. Researchers inde-
pendently judge which articles to include and exclude from
the review and then resolve disagreements. Since working
in pairs is standard practice, this is sometimes called dual-
review. For each study, researchers document information
on effect sizes and contextual factors (e.g., research design,
subject populations) in spreadsheets, sometimes called ev-
idence tables. The data collected in evidence tables is then
statistically aggregated in meta-analysis. Following these
procedures helps researchers answer a targeted research
question while to mitigating potential biases (e.g., selection
bias, confirmation bias) that might otherwise accrue.
In practice, researchers sometimes do not adhere strictly to
these standards. Researchers under time pressure may take
shortcuts (i.e., rapid review [24, 40, 76]) by surveying the
literature through citation trails or by making inclusion and
exclusion decisions individually. If the literature on a topic
is sparse or studies cover a variety of populations and con-
texts, it is difficult to follow conventions of systematic review
and conventional meta-analysis may be inadvisable [17, 46].
Researchers may choose to conduct a scoping study [2, 45]
in which they survey the breadth of literature to identify
gaps in knowledge. The impacts of rapid review and scoping
study methods on quality of findings have only been studied
recently [60, 72], and there is disagreement about best prac-
tices. We contribute a characterization of the gap between
best practice and actual practice.
Softare for Research Synthesis
Interactive systems for research synthesis offer relatively
little support for reasoning about possible analysis paths.
Software tends to provide features for common steps in
the analysis process such as forms for risk of bias assess-
ment [16, 71], data extraction [16, 71], or creating forest and
funnel plots of meta-analytic results [6, 9, 16, 71, 74]. Addi-
tionally, most tools focus exclusively on a single stage in the
analysis process [5] such as study screening [59] or meta-
analysis [6, 9, 74]. Designing research software as a set of
isolated optional procedures forces the researcher to conduct
alternative analyses sequentially and separately. Further, this
design fails to represent the motivations and constraints that
drive researchers’ decision-making.
1See Manski’s critique [53] about difficulty interpreting meta-analyses.
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Three tools in particular—RevMan [16], Eppi-Reviewer [71],
and Rayyan [59]— offer collaboration features, such as role
assignment [16], review flow diagrams [71], and coding dis-
agreement overviews [59], which help researchers coordi-
nate and review their work. However, with the exception of
highlighting disagreements about study inclusion/exclusion
(a decision with implicit alternatives), these features do not
help researchers identify and weigh alternative analyses.
Eppi-Reviewer [71] allows users to create custom “codesets”
and annotations to code the status of studies under review
and take notes. However, researchers may overlook the ben-
efits of using these features to document motivations and
constraints that guide their analyses in order to support later
recall or scrutiny, instead using them inconsistently or not
at all. Rayyan [59] uses a pulldown interface to enable re-
searchers to select or create a reason for their decision to
include/exclude a study. While this elicitation technique is
a promising way of linking reasoning to decisions, Rayyan
does not document competing motivations or constraints
unless they are provided by different users who disagree
about study screening.
We point to opportunities for tools to better support re-
searchers in exploring, reasoning about, and communicating
uncertainty about alternative analyses.
3 METHOD
We conducted open-ended conversational interviews with
professional researchers to investigate practices in applied
research synthesis. The goals of these interviews were to
(1) characterize how researchers manage possible analysis
paths, (2) gather information about the reasoning behind
their choices, and (3) study how interactive systems can sup-
port awareness of uncertainty in analytical decision-making.
Sampling Participants
We employed convenience and snowball sampling [19] to
find 11 professional scientists to interview for our study.
First, we reached out to four professors at the Medical Cen-
ter of a large public university who had recently published at
least one systematic review or meta-analysis to advocate for
evidence-based practices, such as utilitarian healthcare poli-
cies. Through these professors, we were able to interview
one additional postdoctoral researcher studying teaching
strategies in STEM. Second, we recruited two PhDs from the
Veterans’ Affairs Medical Center in a major US city work-
ing on systematic review and meta-analysis to recommend
treatments for veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and substance use disorder (SUD). Last, we used con-
nections in the Navy to recruit four scientists using research
synthesis to recommend improvements in training practices
for military pilots. Of all the 13 people we contacted, only
two declined to interview. Our sample represents people
doing research synthesis in formal professional settings.
Interview Guide
We created an open-ended conversational interview guide [48,
56] with the objective of getting participants to discuss their
research practices in terms of specific examples. The inter-
view guide was a list of topics of interest regarding decision-
points at different stages of the research process: scoping
research questions, sampling literature, assessing and orga-
nizing evidence, analysis and visualization, and communicat-
ing findings (see Supplemental Material 2). For the first five
interviews, the guide was formatted as a list of questions, but
we abridged these questions to a list of topics [48] covering
the same content in order to better accommodate the need
to ask questions in terms of the experiences of individual
researchers [56], whose work varied in methods and settings.
Most often the interviewer broached a topic by asking a
question of the form, “How did you...” For example, “When
you conducted that literature review, how did you decide
which papers to include or exclude from your review?” The
interviewer also asked follow-up questions to seek clarifica-
tion or greater detail about particular analytical decisions.
The interview guide structured our conversations around a
consistent set of topics while allowing flexibility to probe for
a greater depth of description when necessary.
Qualitative Coding Process
All interviews, transcription, qualitative coding, and analysis
were conducted by the first author, with iterative feedback
on the coding and analysis framework from the other two
authors. The analyses presented in this paper represent the
perspectives of our participants systematically curated in
an interpretive framework which was developed through
discussions among the authors.
Transcription. The first author listened to audio recordings of
interviews and transcribed all episodes of interest, omitting
from transcription only small talk that was obviously not
relevant to research synthesis.
Creating a Coding Framework. To build familiarity with the
content in the early interviews, the first author used open
coding [19] to describe what participants said about their
research practices (e.g., literature review, meta-analysis, com-
munication). Open coding helped us determine what we
could reasonably infer from our interviews, similar to the
use of grounded theory in related prior work [10]. Three
provisional themes emerged. Participants described decisions
they made throughout the scientific process, the reasons and
2https://github.com/kalealex/analysis_paths_research_synthesis/tree/
master/interview
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Figure 1: A pictorial representation of strategies used to navigate the garden of forking paths. The diagram at the top depicts
observed temporal orderings of these strategies, e.g., multiplexing across choices in a loop of acknowledgement and reduction.
constraints which guided those decisions, and specific ideas
about how software features could support their work.
We used the themes identified in open coding to develop a
more targeted framework (see Analytical Framework) charac-
terizing analytical decisions and the reasoning behind them.
For each decision, we made a set of categorical judgments
about the nature of the decision and the rationale provided
and recorded contextual information about the practices de-
scribed. We continued to code instances where interviewees
stated needs for software support in order to help us identify
design opportunities in software for research synthesis. We
kept track of these codes in a spreadsheet with one row per
decision (see Supplemental Material 3).
Fine-tuning this framework was an iterative process. The
first author coded analytical decisions and noted issues that
came up during coding. Then, the first author presented these
issues to collaborators for feedback and discussion. The final
coding scheme (described below) represents our consensus
about how to best characterize the practices described by our
participants as they relate to the challenges of navigating
the garden of forking paths.
Analytical Framework
At the heart of the framework are analytical decisions
described by participants. We were primarily concerned with
how each decision acted on the space of possible analysis
paths, for example, by surveying multiple paths or selecting
one path through some procedure (Fig. 1). Following Lipshitz
and Strauss [47], we coded each decision as an instantiation
of one of the following three strategies:
(1) Acknowledge [Ack.] uncertainty by accounting for dif-
ferent possibilities and planning to confront or avoid
3https://github.com/kalealex/analysis_paths_research_synthesis/tree/
master/analysis
potential risks. This includes decisions to explore pos-
sible analysis paths, orient the research toward a broad
set of issues, check for potential problems, and provide
details or caveats in order to preempt misinterpreta-
tions of scientific evidence.
(2) Reduce [Red.] uncertainty by gathering information,
applying rules or conventions, making assumptions,
or adopting a specific procedure to exert control over
uncertainty. This includes decisions to seek informa-
tion on a particular topic, to select and encode specific
evidence, and to follow a rule (e.g., inclusion criteria)
at a decision-point.
(3) Suppress [Sup.] uncertainty by eliminating possibili-
ties through intuition, guessing, or other procedures
which accumulate unnecessary error. We only coded
decisions as suppression when participants expressed
that an alternative analysis path would contribute less
error to their analysis.
These strategies entail different levels of justification for
analytical decisions and tend to have a temporal order (Fig. 1,
top). Imagine a researcher conducting a meta-analysis on
the effect of mindfulness on depression. The researcher first
decides to search the “gray literature” (i.e., unpublished or
unconventional sources), orienting the scope of their search
before engaging in targeted information retrieval, an exam-
ple of the acknowledgement strategy. Decisions which ac-
knowledge uncertainty often steer research broadly, survey-
ing possible analysis paths and associated trade-offs prior to
definitive choices about how to implement the analysis. Next,
while reviewing the gray literature for their meta-analysis,
the researcher decides to search unpublished dissertations
for relevant data, an example of the reduction strategy. Deci-
sions which reduce uncertainty use specific procedures to
navigate analysis paths, sometimes pruning away possible
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paths by omission. Reduction often builds on acknowledge-
ment by implementing the broad goals identified in acknowl-
edgement through a specific approach to analysis. While
still engaged in data collection for their meta-analysis on
mindfulness, the researcher chooses not to examine the risk
of bias in individual studies in their sample. The researcher
knows this is not ideal but rationalizes this decision because
they have limited time to conduct their analysis. Decisions
which suppress uncertainty are often necessary but unjusti-
fiable compromises in response to situational factors which
are sometimes beyond the researcher’s control. Suppression
substitutes for acknowledgment or reduction strategies.
We also coded aspects of decision context.We recorded the
stage in the research process (e.g., question formation, lit-
erature review, meta-analysis) for each decision. This allowed
us to compare the relative frequencies of different strategies
at different stages in the research process, roughly following
the way that Wicherts et al. [77] break up researcher degrees
of freedom into different phases of analysis.
We coded the reason given for each decision (e.g., striv-
ing for reproducibility, limited availability of information,
standard practices). Sometimes these reasons were not ex-
plicitly stated, and we had to infer them from the broader
context of our discussions with participants. Coding the rea-
sons for each decision allowed us to examine what factors
motivated participants to engage in each strategy.
We extended the notion of the garden of forking paths to
communicative andorganizational decisions.We coded
a distinction between decisions which have a direct impact
on the final written report of results and decisions which
have an indirect impact on results through interpretive and
communicative aspects of the scientific process. This dis-
tinction allowed us to highlight analytical decisions with
impacts that may be difficult or impossible to quantify.
We also codedmetadata such as the participant, their field
of study, and the goal of their project. Lastly, we noted when
a decision was associated with a particular need for software
features or a particular threat to validity. These passages
informed our discussion of challenges and opportunities in
designing for the garden of forking paths.
4 RESULTS
Decision-Making Strategies
We coded 480 analytical decisions in our interviews. The
majority were decisions to reduce uncertainty (297 of 480 de-
cisions; 61.9%), followed by decisions to acknowledge uncer-
tainty (139 of 480 decisions; 29.0%) and suppress uncertainty
(44 of 480 decisions; 9.2%).
Acknowledgement. Acknowledging uncertaintywasmost preva-
lent early in the research process when researchers define
questions and objectives (24 of 48 decisions; 50.0%) (Fig. 2).
Figure 2: Frequencies of analytical decisions and percent-
ages of strategies coded at each stage of the research process.
Participants identified this early scoping of the review as
very important to a straightforward and systematic analysis.
“If I spend time thinking about and writing down what my pop-
ulation, intervention, etc. is for my question, then that makes
my literature review that much more efficient. Because then, as
I run across a new study, it should be that much easier to say,
‘Is it in or is it out? Does it give me one of my outcomes that I’ve
specified?’ If it doesn’t, then it’s not included. It prevents you
from getting mired down in indecision.” [Ack.] (P3). Multiple
researchers described a similar practice of considering possi-
ble analysis paths early on and writing a scope description to
guide later analytical decisions. Although researchers often
rely on frameworks (e.g., PICOTS, described by Nelson [58])
to guide scope development, links between scope and subse-
quent decisions are maintained in digital or paper notes if
they are documented at all.
We also see relatively more acknowledgement during litera-
ture review (37 of 117 decisions; 31.6%), quantitative analysis
(10 of 30 decisions; 33.3%), and communication (39 or 119
decisions; 32.8%) than in data collection (17 of 85 decisions;
20.0%) and meta-analysis (12 of 72 decisions; 16.7%) (Fig. 2).
Researchers acknowledge uncertainty in later stages of re-
search mostly to confront irreducible sources of uncertainty.
For example, one researcher in the Navy described using
caveats to qualify information gathered through interviews
with Navy personnel. “Usually it ends up being a time issue
or access. [We] did not have time to go out and validate that
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this is how they actually perform the work on the job. We
just take people’s word for it.” [Ack.] (P2). In a similar case of
acknowledgement to avoid potential misunderstandings of
evidence, another researcher described checking the qual-
ity of available data. “I’ll use data visualization as I’m going
through the process to see if there are things that look really
weird. Like, I’ll make a little ggplot and look to see if things are
falling in the range that I expect them to.” [Ack.] (P9). When
available information or resources constrain analysis paths,
researchers tend to rely on acknowledgement to communi-
cate limitations or check impacts on data quality.
Reduction vs Suppression. The high frequency of strategies to
reduce uncertainty at every stage in analysis (Fig. 2) suggests
that researchers often employ rule-based reasoning when im-
plementing their scientific review and analysis. These rules
are a mix of standard practices and lab-specific procedures.
For example, one researcher studying behavioral treatments
for PTSD augmented the common practice of meta-analyzing
only between-subjects experiments by looking separately at
within-subjects evaluations to validate the treatment effect
within an individual. “Most meta-analyses only look at the
between-group [studies], and they just assume that there is
sufficient within-subject change to warrant doing any of it. I
don’t think that is as useful. That’s the other big thing we are
adding with this meta-analysis are these within-subjects tests
to contextualize the between-group [effect]. I’ve never seen a
meta-analysis in my area that does both, but systematic re-
views do.” [Red.] (P10). All researchers expressed awareness
of best practices and deviated from them at times, but re-
searchers had different attitudes about when and how much
it was appropriate to bend the rules.
Sometimes researchers have little choice but to follow a
path which they know is not ideal. For example, a Navy sci-
entist measuring in-flight blood-oxygen levels to fill a gap in
existing evidence described a decision to use finger-mounted
monitors rather than more precise head-mounted monitors.
“Constraints of the experiment make it so that you can’t get
big head-mounted monitors and have a pilot wear their helmet
at the same time. You have to make concessions where you
can and realize that there’s going to be some variability and
error in your data just based on where your monitors are at.”
[Sup.] (P5). The participant went on to describe how they
would acknowledge this measurement error in their written
report. When the best option available to researchers adds
a source of error to analysis, the line between strategies of
reduction and suppression is blurred, and researchers need
to document how their analysis is constrained in order to
alert stakeholders to potential suppression of uncertainty.
Although we code suppression of uncertainty infrequently
(44 of 480 decisions; 9.2%), we suspect that suppression is
underrepresented in our sample because researchers may not
recognize or admit when decisions introduce greater error
than other viable alternatives. For example, “We are for sure
not including any qualitative research. The only two outcome
measures we are interested in are exam score and failure rate.
So maybe active learning changed how students feel about [the
classroom climate], and maybe they have qualitative data from
a survey. We are not including that either, and that’s driven
completely by our research question.” [Red.] (P4). Although
the researcher attributed the decision to ignore qualitative
work to their research question, earlier in our interview they
described potential biases in the framing of their research
question. “Before we started this meta-analysis, we wondered
if maybe class size would be an explanatory variable in how
well active learning works, or subject area, or whether it’s an
intro class or an upper-division class. Things like that, our
relatively small research team came up with those things, so
there’s totally a bias present in the things that we omitted and
the things that we included.” [Sup.] (P4). Researchers need
ways to represent and keep track of the reasoning behind
analytical decisions in part because, as this researcher put
it, “Defining where the personal bias is coming in and where
specifically it’s problematic would be important.” (P4). We
argue that helping researchers document sources of bias,
and how they influence analytical decisions throughout a
research project, would serve to identify situational sources
of uncertainty which are opaque in current research practice.
Communicative and Organizational Practices
We made a distinction between decisions which have direct
impact on the content presented in the written report of find-
ings and decisions which have indirect impact on findings.
Decisions with indirect impact do not change the quantita-
tive or qualitative evidence presented in the written report
of findings, but they change the way evidence is recorded in
work documents and framed in meetings with collaborators
or presentations to stakeholders. These social and commu-
nicative aspects of the research process have the potential to
impact how findings and recommendations are interpreted.
Decisions with indirect impact rely more on acknowledging
uncertainty (79 of 201 decisions; 39.3%) than decisions with
direct impact (60 of 279 decisions; 21.5%). Often these are
decisions about how to organize or manage a review. “We
create a timeline and meet once a week to share what we’ve
learned... and see where we have some challenges that we need
to work on. If we’ve got to jump in and help someone else, then
we’ll do that too.” [Ack.] (P6). Decisions to discuss issues with
collaborators often serve to acknowledge possible ways of
handling subsequent decisions with direct impact, such as
how to sample the literature. “When the [search] term isn’t
clear, it’s a nightmare... That’s sort of this ongoing iterative
process, and honestly I don’t think there’s a way around it...
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The conversations with collaborators have been the best way
to [narrow the scope] in my experience.” [Ack.] (P9).
Other times, decisionswith indirect impact are about check-
ing the evidence in the review to preempt potential problems
later on. “Before the literature search is a tenth over, you should
revisit your template against the literature you’ve examined.
You can double-check your template [for the evidence table] to
make sure it’s right, and you adjust it.” [Ack.] (P7). By check-
ing that the columns of the evidence table adequately reflect
important themes in the literature, the researcher ensures
that their review is comprehensive. Decisions with indirect
impact are scattered across notes, spreadsheets, and personal
correspondences, yet they play an important role in shaping
the scientific process behind the scenes.
In contrast, decisions with direct impact tend to rely more
on the reduction strategy (190 of 279 decisions; 68.1%) than
decisions with indirect impact (107 of 201 decisions; 53.2%).
For example, one participant described a relaxed approach
to systematic review which did not rely on evidence tables.
“We were kind of looking for whether a study was really sound
or not. Some were more easily brushed aside because it seemed
like their research design was not something we would have
followed, so we trusted each other to weed some of those out
early on.” [Red.] (P6). This researcher’s team excluded and
reviewed studies outside the context of a consistent tem-
plate. When asked if they would use an evidence table, this
participant said, “If there was a spreadsheet already created,
and I could tailor it to what might be most important for our
particular project, then I think I would use that. But as far as
using it every time and pulling out every piece of [informa-
tion], I would literally have to have an intern do that for me
because I don’t have time.” (P6). Shortcuts, such as forgoing
dual-review and evidence tables, are essential to researchers
in the Navy because they operate on tight timelines.
Motivations
During our qualitative analysis we inductively coded 21 dif-
ferent reasons for researchers’ decisions. We then grouped
these 21 reasons into six themes which capture the motiva-
tions behind researchers’ decision-making (Fig. 3).
• Principles (93 of 480 decisions; 19.4%): ideals which
researchers adhere to such as comprehensiveness of
the review, reproducibility in judgments, consistency
in how evidence is evaluated.
• Social Factors (55 of 480 decisions; 11.5%): strictly
communicative or interpersonal influences on decision-
making such as a desire for ease of understanding or
building confidence through consensus.
• Domain-Specific Factors (67 of 480 decisions; 14.0%):
concerns related to the domain under study such as
Figure 3: Categorized reasons for analytical decisions.
cases where the researcher relies on domain knowledge
or seeks conceptual clarity regarding key constructs.
• Conventions (73 of 480 decisions; 15.2%): standard
practices which often reflect established knowledge
about how to deal with issues like statistical power.
• Self-ImposedConstraints (107 of 480 decisions; 22.3%):
factors which are under the control of the individual
researcher such as research questions, preferences, or
acting on a sense of caution or a lack of knowledge
about research procedures.
• External Constraints (85 of 480 decisions; 17.7%):
factors beyond the researchers’ control such as limited
availability of information, limited time and attention
for the review, limited control of research objectives, or
limited alternatives to the chosen analysis path.
In our interviews, decisions to acknowledge uncertainty
were most often motivated by principles (46 of 139 decisions;
33.1%), domain-specific factors (32 of 139 decisions; 23.0%),
and self-imposed constraints (21 of 139 decisions; 15.1%).
This suggests that acknowledging uncertainty is often vol-
untary and carefully thought out on the part of researchers.
Researchers are particularly motivated by the principle of
comprehensiveness (75 of 93 decisions; 80.6%), often report-
ing that they provide detailed background information in
their written report, check data quality, and code possible
covariates in their evidence tables. These practices serve the
purpose of a complete and thorough review.
The motivations for decisions to reduce uncertainty are
fairly balanced, with self-imposed constraints (81 of 297 de-
cisions; 27.3%) and conventions (60 of 297 decisions; 20.2%)
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being most prevalent. By analyzing participants’ motiva-
tions, we find that not all decisions to reduce uncertainty are
equally justified, and this is further evidence of a blurred line
between reduction and suppression strategies. For example,
one participant described flexibility in defining the search
terms used to sample the literature. “It’s helpful when you
have a sense of how many studies you’re talking about. In
the psychiatric conditions, there was a study looking at anger.
Anger is not exactly—there’s not a diagnosis associated with
that. Initially, I wanted to include it, but there’s only a cou-
ple of studies for which that is relevant, so it seemed like it
was cleaner to just exclude anger because it’s not a diagnosis.
It’s just two studies; it’s not a big deal... We don’t want to do
a systematic review with two studies; we don’t want to do a
systematic review with 100 studies because it’s probably not
targeted enough. It seemed like some of that process was find-
ing a happy medium.” [Red.] (P9). By sampling in order to hit
a target sample size, the researcher may ignore constructs
which are theoretically important but hard to measure.
In contrast, another researcher described a decision to in-
clude a group with two studies in a hierarchical meta-analysis
(P3) (i.e., meta-regression) in order to address their research
question. Later, when speaking in general terms, they said
that using groups of studies which are too small in meta-
regression leads to unrepresentative results and poor sta-
tistical power. These decisions about how to group studies
highlight a trade-off between conventions—adhering to sta-
tistical best practices by having large enough samples in each
group—and self-imposed constraints—evaluating a specific
research question by using a certain grouping factor in a
statistical model. The frequency of external constraints as
a motivator for suppression (33 of 44 decisions; 75.0%) and
the thin line between suppression and reduction strategies
suggest that researchers would benefit from documenting
the reasoning behind their analytical decisions.
5 DESIGN FOR THE GARDEN OF FORKING PATHS
Our findings point to challenges in designing interactive sys-
tems to support research synthesis which faithfully represent
the relevant empirical evidence while accounting for organi-
zational and individual constraints and goals in the synthesis
process. Specific challenges that emerge from our results in-
clude: 1) a tension in current practice between researchers’
strong desire to consider multiple possible analysis paths,
as evidenced by the prevalence of acknowledgement, and
the frequent influence of self-imposed constraints in moti-
vating the reduction of uncertainty; 2) a lack of consistent
representations and processes for capturing their rationales
for decisions, limiting researchers’ ability to reflect on their
rationales; and 3) a trade-off between researchers’ desire to
acknowledge uncertainty (e.g., by stating caveats) and the
need to tell a clear story with their analysis (e.g., filtering
evidence based on their research question).
Research Synthesis as Expected Utility Maximization
The inherent subjectivity in scoping a systematic review
or meta-analysis, combined with the influence of external
constraints, suggests that the single “best” analysis may not
always be the analysis that is chosen in an organization. To
guide reflection on how interactive software might better
support researchers’ endeavors, we frame research synthesis
as a process aimed at maximizing the expected utility of anal-
ysis as perceived by the researcher within an organization.
An expected utility framework assumes that a person will
decide between multiple actions by reasoning about the ex-
pected consequences of each in combination with the value
they place on those consequences, which is defined by a
utility function [75]. While the consequences of actions (e.g.,
betting strategies) in a classic example of utility are mone-
tary payoffs, we suggest that an adaption of utility theory
for research synthesis might frame the relevant consequence
of an action, or a choice of analysis, as the accuracy or faith-
fulness with which the analysis captures the true state of the
world. Since the true state of the world is unknown, there
is uncertainty about the faithfulness of any analysis. In re-
search synthesis perceived uncertainty takes the form of the
researcher’s subjective sense of confidence in the accuracy of
possible analyses. The criterion for choosing between actions
is the average utility of each action given the uncertainty.
Under utility theory a decision-maker should be able to
choose the higher utility alternative given any pair of ac-
tions (or alternatively, should be able to declare them equal
in utility) [36, 75]. This assumption implies that interactive
systems for research synthesis could help researchers choose
the paths that maximize their expected utility by helping
them to 1) accurately perceive the consequences of different
analysis paths (i.e., actions). Because the true state of the
world, and thus the exact consequences of an analysis, may
be impossible to judge, researchers may use heuristics such
as looking at the results of different paths or considering
competing values to make decisions. Similarly, interactive
systems could also support researchers directly in 2) identi-
fying how much they value the accuracy of different paths.
Acknowledging Alternative Analyses
Challenge: Trying a set of analyses instead of just one. Our in-
terviews suggest that one of the core challenges in designing
for research synthesis is supporting judgments about when
a given analysis is justified. The pitfall for researchers is the
thin line between exploratory analysis and using researcher
degrees of freedom to select an analysis path which confirms
a particular hypothesis or point of view. An episode from one
of our interviews illustrates this ambiguity: “Through those
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discussions that we have, we’ll have suggestions for different
types of analysis we can conduct that might split the hair a
little bit differently and give us additional information that we
can then decide, ‘Okay, what is the best way to report this now
that we’ve looked at it both of these ways?”’ (P6). In cases like
this, we argue that any reduction strategy used to select a
particular analysis may actually be suppressing uncertainty
because presenting one analysis path among multiple paths
observed may reflect confirmation bias as much as the true
state of the world.
Prior work on reliable statistics [67, 69] suggests that re-
searchers should survey possible analysis paths and multi-
plex across them by exploring and reporting a reasonable
subset of analyses. Because comprehensiveness was the most
prevalent motivation for analytical decisions in our analysis,
we suspect that researchers are naturally incentivized to ex-
plore possible analyses and that they will do so to the extent
that tools make it feasible. Being able to directly evaluate
how different paths impact results would provide researchers
with relevant information for determining what paths have
higher utility given their various motivations and constraints.
For example, when the differences in results between paths
are minimal, the researcher may decide to choose a path
that “trades-off” accuracy with other desirable properties
like minimizing time or resources spent, or maximizing con-
sensus or interpretability 4. When results are highly variable,
the researcher should exercise extreme caution and consider
reporting multiple analyses if possible.
Of course, researchers may not always be motivated re-
port on multiple analyses paths if they prefer a certain re-
sult, raising the ethical dilemma that developing tools which
make it easier to explore alternative analyses may facilitate
the cherry-picking of results. The need to explore multiple
analyses and the risk that this multiplexing will facilitate
cherry-picking remains a tension in the broader set of rec-
ommendations in the literature on reducing bias in analysis.
Opportunity: Multiverse analysis. Each possible analysis in
the garden of forking paths produces a distribution of esti-
mates which represents error in the analysis process. This is
distinct from uncertainty about which path most accurately
represents the evidence (i.e., the true underlying effect). Prior
work [67, 69] suggests that, ideally, researchers should quan-
tify and report uncertainty about analytical decisions by
running a subset of possible analyses to see which decisions
impact results, a procedure called multiverse analysis. Simi-
lar work on model comparison techniques (e.g., [51, 53, 61])
suggests that researchers should build and compare multi-
ple models expressing assumptions of varying strength in
4An alternative framing of decisions about paths in our study results could
define utility as a function of path accuracy alone, and choices of non-
optimal paths as “satisficing” under bounded rationality [66]
order to separate uncertainty of evidence from uncertainty
of assumptions in their analysis. These convergent lines of
research suggest an opportunity for interactive systems to
elicit a set of analysis paths under consideration and sup-
port researchers in interactively comparing outcomes from
multiple quantitative analyses.
Opportunity: Visualizing the garden of forking paths. In order
to support researchers in exploring, comparing, and report-
ing on multiple possible analyses, interactive systems need
an explicit way to represent analytical decisions and elicit
information about possible analyses from researchers. Based
on prior work on interactive visualization of scientific work-
flows [12], we point out the opportunity to represent the
garden of forking paths using interactive diagrams which
help researchers map out decision-points and their influence
on one another as nodes and edges. We propose other op-
portunities related to reasoning with and communicating
uncertainty which build on this representation.
Representing Reasoning About Analysis
Challenge: Shifting attention from rationales to impacts. When
prompted to describe the reasoning behind analytical deci-
sions, researchers tend to focus on factors which rationalize
their choices, often appealing to standard practices and re-
search questions rather than examining the impacts of their
choices on the results of analysis. For instance, we compare
two cases where researchers made opposite decisions about
whether or not to include a group of two studies in a meta-
regression (see Results: Motivations). Both researchers were
aware that two studies would not give them enough statisti-
cal power to make a precise effect size estimate, but instead
they rationalized their decisions by appealing to conventions
(P9) and research questions (P3). We observe that researchers
document their rationales inconsistently across personal cor-
respondences, notes, and work documents. This may con-
tribute to difficulty weighing these motivations alongside
the outcomes of alternative analysis paths. Considering ra-
tionales in the absence of information about outcomes leads
to a sense of utility that is driven primarily by the perceived
value of a choice independent of its consequences. We argue
that this problem would be mitigated by interactive systems
that formally represent researchers’ reasoning about analy-
sis paths and attempt to shift researchers’ attention to the
impacts of decisions on the results of analysis.
Opportunity: Attributing rationale. While researchers often
have a rationale for their decisions, they seem to lack the
tools to externalize and review the motivations and con-
straints which shape their analysis. For example, one re-
searcher expressed the need for a way to track conceptual
uncertainty when coding evidence tables in Excel. “If [a
flag or annotation is] associated with the value in a cell, I
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think that would help coders feel more confident even if you’re
not ultimately going to do anything about it. And it might
help your quality control checks at the end.” (P4). In agree-
ment with this researcher, prior work on how uncertainty
is represented in visual analytics systems [62] suggests that
helping users maintain awareness of sources of uncertainty
improves the calibration of confidence in the accuracy of
the analysis. Given an interactive visualization of the gar-
den of forking paths, a system could enable researchers to
create custom flags associated with factors which influence
analytical decision-making such as rules, assumptions, and
conventions, as well as guidelines (e.g., scope descriptions
and research questions) and constraints (e.g., limited time
and attention). Researchers could use these flags to represent
their reasoning at a given decision-point by attributing their
choice to a set of rationales. We speculate that mapping out
rationales for alternative analyses might highlight trade-offs
between different motivations and thus prompt researchers
to reflect on and potentially update their decisions.
Opportunity: Aligning subjective and statistical uncertainty.
Since the true state of the world is unknown, researchers
must rely on their subjective sense of the accuracy of anal-
yses (i.e., confidence) to decide between alternative paths.
However, some of the rationales given by researchers (e.g.,
conventions) are essentially appeals to authority, suggesting
that researchers sometimes feel uncomfortable with their
ability to judge the consequences of alternative analyses.
Prior work [33] shows that comparing predicted effect size
distributions to observed outcomes helps some form expec-
tations about effects that better align with statistical uncer-
tainty. Expressing subjective expectations promotes more
active reasoning [41, 42], and using visual representations
offloads information from working memory [18, 57], freeing
up attention for metacognitive reflection [63] about how ef-
fects are understood. This suggests an opportunity to help
researchers calibrate their expectations about the impacts of
analytical decisions through comparisons of subjective uncer-
tainty, elicited by a system using graphical or other formats
(e.g., [28, 33, 41–43]), and statistical uncertainty, achieved
through computation. Based on prior work [15], we specu-
late that the experiential learning that occurs through such
prediction can ultimately help foster confidence as well as
accuracy in one’s predictions.
Communicating Uncertainty
Challenge: Varying tolerance for uncertainty. Researchers we
interviewed tend to remain skeptical about their findings,
but they often need to present findings in a way that offers
convincing support for recommendations. Contributing to
this tension, it has been argued that decision-makers [4, 8,
11, 52, 70, 78, 79] (and people in general [21, 22, 25]) have
limited tolerance for uncertainty. “They want a visualization
that shows gross effect, it gets down to the point, so they are
no longer wanting a string of visualizations to illustrate every
point. If you write about the methodology, you write about
your data crunching, and then you show your visualization
for your final result, that is what decision-makers are hungry
for and are expecting now... They do care about the fidelity of
the data, they just don’t want a chart on it.” (P11). In practice,
this Navy researcher told a simplified and compelling story
advocating for a promising training program. They empha-
sized the trade-off between downplaying uncertainty to get
decisions made and doing just the opposite when there was
concern about the safety of Navy personnel. “If it’s a really
important decision that you need to impress upon them, that
there is a significant thing to consider, then I will sometimes do
the findings a disservice by presenting the problem and burying
the potential compelling use case or storyline.” (P11).
Opportunity: Visualizing possible outcomes. We argue that
interactive systems for research synthesis should provide a
set of visualizations for distributions of possible outcomes,
which attempt to alleviate specific aversions that decision-
makers have toward uncertainty. One major aversion to un-
certainty is that many people, even experts [7, 68], find it
hard to understand [37]. Prior work in psychology [29, 30],
statistical reasoning [27, 28, 31], and data visualization [23,
33, 34, 38, 39] suggests a remedy to this problem: people rea-
son about uncertainty most accurately when it is framed as
frequencies of events, rather than probabilities or summary
statistics. As such, visualizations of quantitative uncertainty
should convey the possibility of multiple outcomes using
frequency framing to circumvent misunderstandings of un-
certainty. When it is important to convey uncertainty in
possible outcomes with high fidelity, hypothetical outcome
plots [34, 38, 43] and quantile dotplots [23, 33, 39] are valu-
able visualization formats. By presenting discrete outcomes,
these formats align with results from prior work in statistics
pedagogy suggesting that people develop better statistical
intuitions via simulations [13, 14, 20, 35, 68].
In contrast, when decision-makers have low tolerance for
uncertainty because they want a clear yes-or-no answer, vi-
sualizations could be designed to emphasize modal results
while still displaying uncertainty, as supported by most static
representations of distributions, including intervals. Addi-
tionally, propagating uncertainty in the effect distribution
to derived measures that may be more closely aligned with
the decision-maker’s utility function, such as money or time
saved, might help decision-makers appreciate uncertainty
information for the purpose of making more informed de-
cisions. “There are these situations where you face the moral
quandary of having to tell a company that you wasted their
time [on inconclusive results] or giving them information that
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isn’t very useful to them [because the analysis misrepresents
available evidence to give an exaggerated sense of certainty].”
(P5). We argue that providing researchers with communica-
tion techniques which counteract decision-makers’ specific
aversions to uncertainty would mitigate the misconception
that an uncertain result is not presentable and does not con-
tain useful information. Of course, the best way to iden-
tify the impact of the techniques we propose is to evaluate
decision-making given different communication strategies.
Opportunity: Conveying qualitative uncertainties. In our inter-
views we find that researchers express qualitative forms of
uncertainty such as the assumptions and constraints behind
their analysis by writing caveats in limitations sections or
preparing supplemental presentation slides. Descriptive ac-
counts of uncertainty help researchers align the expectations
of decision-makers with the quality of available scientific ev-
idence. In the words of one researcher, “There is no such thing
as a perfect study, but maybe if there was some way to make
that information more readily available to researchers so that I
clearly see a trend in limitations that are going on in this area
of research. How am I not going to let that affect mine, or how
can I at least convey that skepticism to my potential employer
so that they know what might impact their results?” (P5). Prior
work [52, 53] suggests that uncertainty about assumptions
is often overlooked by decision-makers, leading to an exag-
gerated sense of certainty about analytical results. Drawing
on the opportunities we identify for representing reasoning
about analytical decisions, a system could use rationales and
their associations with decisions to create summary repre-
sentations of assumptions, constraints, and limitations which
should inform the decision-maker’s sense of utility. Future
work should explore the design space for representing and
communicating these qualitative uncertainties.
Limitations
Limitations of our procedure for sampling analytical deci-
sions introduce imprecision into the frequencies of decision-
making strategies presented in our results. The sample of
researchers we interviewed may not be representative of
the broader population of researchers working in applied
settings. Additionally, we rely on each participant’s account
of whether decisions are justified to inform our coding of
suppression. While this means that our data reflect the per-
spectives of our participants rather than our opinions, it also
means that suppression may be relatively underrepresented
in our sample because researchers may feel disinclined to
admit to choosing less-than-ideal analysis paths.
We draw on expected utility theory to provide a basis for
identifying “better” ways of supporting research synthesis
despite the inevitability of organizational constraints the
process. However, our treatment is not intended to be a
formal model. How to characterize research synthesis as it
occurs in organizations using theories like expected utility
maximization or bounded rationality is left to future work.
6 CONCLUSION
We present a qualitative analysis of how researchers conduct-
ing applied research synthesis navigate the garden of forking
paths: a series of analytical decision-points, each of which
has the potential to influence findings. Based on our inter-
views and analysis, we identify a set of design challenges
around making it more feasible for researchers to try and
report multiple analyses, shifting researchers’ attention from
rationales for decisions to impacts of decisions, and support-
ing uncertainty communication techniques which address
specific aversions to uncertainty among decision-makers.
Considering evidence from our interviews in light of prior
work, we point out opportunities for interactive systems to
support research synthesis by helping researchers map the
garden of forking paths, document their reasoning about
analysis paths, and effectively communicate uncertainties
impacting their analytical decision-making.
7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was funded by US Navy STTR Contract N68335-
17-C-0410 in partnership with Stottler Henke Assoc, and NSF
award #1749266.
REFERENCES
[1] B. F. Anderson, D. H. Deane, K. R. Hammond, and G. H. McClelland.
1981. Concepts in judgment and decision research. Praeger, New York.
[2] H Arksey and L O’Malley. 2005. Scoping Studies: Towards a Method-
ological Framework. International Journal of Social Research Methodol-
ogy 8, 1 (2005), 19–25.
[3] Kenneth J. (Kenneth Joseph) Arrow. 1965. Aspects of the theory of
risk-bearing. (1965).
[4] Maya Bar-hillel and Efrat Neter. 1993. How Alike Is It Versus How
Likely Is It: A Disjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgments. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 65, 6 (1993), 1119–1131.
[5] Leon Bax, Ly Mee Yu, Noriaki Ikeda, and Karel G.M. Moons. 2007.
A systematic comparison of software dedicated to meta-analysis of
causal studies. BMC Medical Research Methodology 7, February 2007
(2007). https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-7-40
[6] Leon Bax, Ly Mee Yu, Noriaki Ikeda, Harukazu Tsuruta, and Karel G.M.
Moons. 2006. Development and validation of MIX: Comprehensive
free software for meta-analysis of causal research data. BMC Medi-
cal Research Methodology 6, 50 (2006), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1186/
1471-2288-6-50
[7] Sarah Belia, Fiona Fidler, Jennifer Williams, and Geoff Cumming. 2005.
Researchers misunderstand confidence intervals and standard error
bars. Psychological methods 10, 4 (2005), 389.
[8] Silvia Bonaccio and Reeshad S Dalal. 2006. Advice taking and decision-
making: An integrative literature review, and implications for the
organizational sciences. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes 101 (2006), 127–151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.07.
001
PREPRINT, PREPRINT, PREPRINT Kale, Kay, & Hullman
[9] M Borenstein, L Hedges, J Higgins, and H Rothstein. 2005. Compre-
hensive Meta-Analysis 2. Engelwood, NJ, Biostat. (2005).
[10] Nadia Boukhelifa, Marc-Emmanuel Perrin, Samuel Huron, and James
Eagan. 2017. How Data Workers Cope with Uncertainty : A Task Char-
acterisation Study. Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems (2017). https://doi.org/10.1145/3025453.
3025738
[11] David V Budescu and Adrian K Rantilla. 2000. Confidence in aggrega-
tion of expert opinions. Acta Psychologica 104 (2000), 371–398.
[12] Steven P Callahan, Juliana Freire, Emanuele Santos, Carlos E Schei-
degger, Cláudio T Silva, and Huy T Vo. 2006. VisTrails: visualization
meets data management. In Proceedings of the 2006 ACM SIGMOD
international conference on Management of data. ACM, 745–747.
[13] Beth Chance, Robert del Mas, and Joan Garfield. 2004. Reasoning about
sampling distribitions. In The challenge of developing statistical literacy,
reasoning and thinking. Springer, 295–323.
[14] B Chance, J Garfield, and B delMas. 1999. A model of classroom
research in action: Developing simulation activities to improve stu-
dentsâĂŹ statistical reasoning. 52nd Session of the International Statis-
tical Institute, Helsinki, Finland (1999).
[15] Beth Chance, Joan Garfield, and Robert delMas. 2000. Developing Sim-
ulation Activities To Improve Students’ Statistical Reasoning. (2000).
[16] The Cochrane Collaboration. 2014. Review Manager (RevMan) 5.1.0.
Copenhagen: The Nordic Cochrane Centre. (2014).
[17] Harris Cooper, Larry V. Hedges, and Jeffrey C. Valentine. 2009. The
Handbook of Research Synthesis and Meta-Analysis. Russell Sage Foun-
dation.
[18] Richard Cox. 1999. Representation construction, externalised, cogni-
tion and individual differences. Learning and Instruction 9, 4 (1999),
343–363. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0959-4752(98)00051-6
[19] J. W. Creswell and C. N. Poth. 2018. Qualitative inquiry & research
design: Choosing among five approaches. SAGE Publications, Inc.
[20] Geoff Cumming and Neil Thomason. 1998. Statplay: Multimedia for
statistical understanding, in pereira-mendoza (ed. In Proceedings of the
Fifth International Conference on Teaching Statistics, ISI. Citeseer.
[21] Shawn P. Curley and J. Frank Yates. 1985. The Center and Range of
the Probability Interval as Factors Affecting Ambiguity Preferences.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 36 (1985), 273—
-287.
[22] Hillel J Einhorn and Robin M Hogarth. 1985. Ambiguity and Uncer-
tainty in Probabilistic Inference. Psychological Review 92, 4 (1985).
[23] Michael Fernandes, Logan Walls, Sean Munson, Jessica Hullman, and
Matthew Kay. 2018. Uncertainty Displays Using Quantile Dotplots
or CDFs Improve Transit Decision-Making. In Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems - CHI ’18. https://doi.org/10.1145/3173574.
3173718
[24] R Ganann, D Ciliska, and H Thomas. 2010. Expediting systematic
reviews: methods and implications of rapid reviews. Implementation
Science (2010), 5–56. https://doi.org/10.1186/1748-5908-5-56
[25] P. Gardenfors and N. Sahlin. 1983. Decision making with unreliable
probabilities. Brit. J. Math. Statist. Psych. 36 (1983), 240–251.
[26] Andrew Gelman and Eric Loken. 2014. The statistical crisis in science.
American Scientist 102, 6 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1511/2014.111.460
[27] Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage. 1995. How to improve Bayesian
reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats. Psychological Re-
view 102 (1995), 684–704.
[28] Daniel G Goldstein and David Rothschild. 2014. Lay understanding of
probability distributions. Judgment and Decision Making 9, 1 (2014), 1.
[29] L Hasher and R T Zacks. 1984. Automatic processing of fundamental
information: the case of frequency of occurrence. The American psy-
chologist 39, 12 (1984), 1372–1388. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.
39.12.1372
[30] Ralph Hertwig, Greg Barron, Elke U Weber, and Ido Erev. 2004. De-
cisions from experience and the effect of rare events in risky choice.
Psychological science 15, 8 (2004), 534–539.
[31] U. Hoffrage and G. Gigerenzer. 1998. Using natural frequencies to
improve diagnostic inferences. Academic Medicine: Journal of the
Association of American Medical Colleges 73, 5 (May 1998), 538–540.
[32] Robin M Hogarth. 1987. Judgement and choice: The psychology of
decision. (1987).
[33] Jessica Hullman, Matthew Kay, Yea-Seul Kim, and Samana Shrestha.
2018. Imagining Replications: Graphical Prediction & Discrete Visu-
alizations Improve Recall & Estimation of Effect Uncertainty. IEEE
Trans. Visualization & Comp. Graphics (Proc. InfoVis) (2018). http:
//idl.cs.washington.edu/papers/imagining-replications
[34] Jessica Hullman, Paul Resnick, and Eytan Adar. 2015. Hypothetical
Outcome Plots Outperform Error Bars and Violin Plots for Inferences
about Reliability of Variable Ordering. PloS one 10, 11 (2015).
[35] D Mills Jamie. 2002. Using computer simulation methods to teach
statistics: A review of the literature. Journal of Statistics Education 10,
1 (2002).
[36] Niels Erik Jensen. 1967. An introduction to Bernoullian utility theory:
I. Utility functions. The Swedish journal of economics (1967), 163–183.
[37] D. Kahneman. 2011. Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
New York.
[38] Alex Kale, Francis Nguyen, Matthew Kay, and Jessica Hullman. 2019.
Hypothetical Outcome Plots Help Untrained Observers Judge Trends
in Ambiguous Data. IEEE Trans. Visualization & Comp. Graphics (Proc.
InfoVis) (2019). http://idl.cs.washington.edu/papers/hops-trends
[39] Matthew Kay, Tara Kola, Jessica Hullman, and Sean Munson. 2016.
When (ish) is my bus? User-centered visualizations of uncertainty in
everyday, mobile predictive systems. In Proceedings of the 34th Annual
ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’16).
[40] S Khangura, K Konnyu, R Cushman, J Grimshaw, and D Moher. 2012.
Evidence summaries: the evolution of a rapid review approach. Syst
Rev (2012), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1186/2046-4053-1-10
[41] Yea-Seul Kim, Katharina Reinecke, and Jessica Hullman. 2017. Ex-
plaining the Gap: Visualizing One’s Predictions Improves Recall and
Comprehension of Data. Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems - CHI ’17 (2017), 1375–1386.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3025453.3025592
[42] Yea-Seul Kim, Katharina Reinecke, and Jessica Hullman. 2018. Data
Through Others’ Eyes: The Impact of Visualizing Others’ Expectations
on Visualization Interpretation. IEEE Trans. Visualization & Comp.
Graphics (Proc. InfoVis) (2018). http://idl.cs.washington.edu/papers/
others-expectations
[43] Yea-Seul Kim, Logan Walls, Peter Krafft, and Jessica Hullman. 2019.
A Bayesian Cognition Approach to Improve Data Visualization. Pro-
ceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems (2019).
[44] George J. Klir and Bo Yuan. 1995. Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic: Theory
and Applications. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA.
[45] D Levac, H Colquhoun, and K K O’Brien. 2010. Scoping studes: ad-
vancing the methodology. Implementation Science 5, 69 (2010), 1–9.
https://doi.org/10.1186/1748-5908-5-69 arXiv:arXiv:1011.1669v3
[46] M.W. Lipsey and D.B. Wilson. 2001. Practical Meta-Analysis. SAGE
Publications.
[47] Raanan Lipshitz and Orna Strauss. 1997. Coping with Uncertainty:
A Naturalistic Decision-Making Analysis. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes 69, 2 (1997), 149–163. https://doi.org/10.
1006/obhd.1997.2679
[48] John Lofland, David Snow, Leon Anderson, and Lyn H. Lofland. 2006.
Analyzing social settings: A guide to qualitative observation and analysis.
Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, Belmond=t, CA.
Decision-Making Under Uncertainty in Research Synthesis PREPRINT, PREPRINT, PREPRINT
[49] K. R. MacCrimmon and D. A. Wehrung. 1986. Taking risks. Free Press,
New York.
[50] Alan M MacEachren, Anthony Robinson, Susan Hopper, Steven Gard-
ner, Robert Murray, Mark Gahegan, and Elisabeth Hetzler. 2005. Visu-
alizing Geospatial Information Uncertainty: What We Know andWhat
We Need to Know. Cartography and Geographic Information Science
32, 3 (2005), 139–160. https://doi.org/10.1559/1523040054738936
[51] Charles F. Manski. 2003. Partial Identification of Probability Distribu-
tions: Springer Series in Statistics. Springer.
[52] Charles F Manski. 2018. Communicating uncertainty in policy analysis.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America (2018). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1722389115
[53] Charles F Manski. 2018. The Lure of Incredible Certitude. Working
Paper 24905. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/
10.3386/w24905
[54] James G March. 1976. Ambiguity and choice in organizations. (1976).
[55] J. G. March and H. A. Simon. 1958. Organizations. Wiley, New York.
[56] M Miles, M Huberman, and J Saldana. 2014. Qualitative Data Analysis:
A Methods Sourcebook (3 ed.). SAGE Publications Inc., Thousand Oaks,
CA, Chapter 2.
[57] Hedwig M. Natter and Dianne C. Berry. 2005. Effects of active infor-
mation processing on the understanding of risk information. Applied
Cognitive Psychology 19, 1 (2005), 123–135. https://doi.org/10.1002/
acp.1068
[58] Heidi D. Nelson. 2014. Systematic Reviews to Answer Health Care
Questions. Wolters Kluwer Health/Lippincott Williams & Wilkins,
Philadelphia, PA.
[59] Mourad Ouzzani, Hossam Hammady, Zbys Fedorowicz, and Ahmed
Elmagarmid. 2016. Rayyan - a web and mobile app for systematic
reviews. (2016). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13643-016-0384-4
[60] Mai T. Pham, Andrijana Rajić, Judy D. Greig, Jan M. Sargeant, An-
drew Papadopoulos, and Scott A. Mcewen. 2014. A scoping re-
view of scoping reviews: Advancing the approach and enhancing
the consistency. Research Synthesis Methods 5, 4 (2014), 371–385.
https://doi.org/10.1002/jrsm.1123 arXiv:arXiv:1011.1669v3
[61] Juho Piironen and Aki Vehtari. 2017. Comparison of Bayesian predic-
tive methods for model selection. Statistics and Computing 27, 3 (01
May 2017), 711–735. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11222-016-9649-y
[62] Dominik Sacha, Hansi Senaratne, Bum Chul Kwon, Geoffrey Ellis, and
Daniel A. Keim. 2016. The Role of Uncertainty, Awareness, and Trust
in Visual Analytics. IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer
Graphics 22, 1 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1109/TVCG.2015.2467591
[63] Gregory Schraw, Kent J. Crippen, and Kendall Hartley. 2006. Promoting
self-regulation in science education: Metacognition as part of a broader
perspective on learning. Research in Science Education 36, 1-2 (2006),
111–139. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11165-005-3917-8
[64] R. Silberzahn, E. L. Uhlmann, D. P. Martin, P. Anselmi, F. Aust, E.
Awtrey, Š. Bahník, F. Bai, C. Bannard, E. Bonnier, R. Carlsson, F. Cheung,
G. Christensen, R. Clay, M. A. Craig, A. Dalla Rosa, L. Dam,M. H. Evans,
I. Flores Cervantes, N. Fong, M. Gamez-Djokic, A. Glenz, S. Gordon-
McKeon, T. J. Heaton, K. Hederos, M. Heene, A. J. Hofelich Mohr, F.
Högden, K. Hui, M. Johannesson, J. Kalodimos, E. Kaszubowski, D. M.
Kennedy, R. Lei, T. A. Lindsay, S. Liverani, C. R. Madan, D. Molden,
E. Molleman, R. D. Morey, L. B. Mulder, B. R. Nijstad, N. G. Pope, B.
Pope, J. M. Prenoveau, F. Rink, E. Robusto, H. Roderique, A. Sandberg,
E. Schlüter, F. D. Schönbrodt, M. F. Sherman, S. A. Sommer, K. Sotak,
S. Spain, C. Spörlein, T. Stafford, L. Stefanutti, S. Tauber, J. Ullrich,
M. Vianello, E.-J. Wagenmakers, M. Witkowiak, S. Yoon, and B. A.
Nosek. 2018. Many Analysts, One Data Set: Making Transparent How
Variations in Analytic Choices Affect Results. Advances in Methods
and Practices in Psychological Science (2018). https://doi.org/10.1177/
2515245917747646
[65] Joseph P Simmons, Leif D Nelson, and Uri Simonsohn. 2011. False-
Positive Psychology : Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection
and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant. Psycho-
logical Science 22, 11 (2011), 1359–1366. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0956797611417632
[66] Herbert A Simon. 1972. Theories of bounded rationality. Decision and
organization 1, 1 (1972), 161–176.
[67] Uri Simonsohn, Joseph P. Simmons, and Leif D. Nelson. 2015. Specifi-
cation Curve: Descriptive and Inferential Statistics on All Reasonable
Specifications. SSRN (Nov 2015). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2694998
[68] Emre Soyer and Robin M Hogarth. 2012. The illusion of predictability:
How regression statistics mislead experts. International Journal of
Forecasting 28, 3 (2012), 695–711.
[69] Sara Steegen, Francis Tuerlinckx, Andrew Gelman, and Wolf Van-
paemel. 2016. Increasing Transparency Through a Multiverse Anal-
ysis. Perspectives on Psychological Science 11, 5 (2016), 702–712.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691616658637
[70] Lyn M Van Swol and Janet A Sniezek. 2005. Factors affecting the
acceptance of expert advice. British Journal of Social Psychology 44
(2005), 443–461. https://doi.org/10.1348/014466604X17092
[71] J Thomas, J Brunton, and S Graziosi. 2010. EPPI-Reviewer 4: software
for research synthesis. EPPI-Centre Software. London: Social Science
Research Unit, UCL Institute of Education. (2010).
[72] Andrea C. Tricco, Jesmin Antony, Wasifa Zarin, Lisa Strifler, Marco
Ghassemi, John Ivory, Laure Perrier, Brian Hutton, David Moher, and
Sharon E. Straus. 2015. A scoping review of rapid review methods.
BMC Medicine 13, 1 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-015-0465-6
arXiv:arXiv:1011.1669v3
[73] Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. 1975. Judgment under uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and biases. In Utility, probability, and human decision
making. Springer, 141–162.
[74] Wolfgang Viechtbauer. 2010. Conducting meta-analyses in R with
the metafor package. Journal of Statistical Software 36, 3 (2010), 1–48.
http://www.jstatsoft.org/v36/i03/
[75] John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, and Ariel Rubinstein. 1944.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (60th Anniversary Commem-
orative Edition). Princeton University Press. http://www.jstor.org/
stable/j.ctt1r2gkx
[76] A Watt, A Cameron, L Sturm, T Lathlean, W Babidge, S Blamey, K
Facey, D Hailey, I Norderhaug, and G Maddern. 2008. Rapid reviews
versus full systematic reviews: an inventory of current methods and
practice in health technology assessment. Int J Technol Assess Health
Care 24 (2008), 133–139. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266462308080185
[77] JelteM.Wicherts, Coosje L.S. Veldkamp, Hilde E.M. Augusteijn, Marjan
Bakker, Robbie C.M. van Aert, and Marcel A.L.M. van Assen. 2016.
Degrees of freedom in planning, running, analyzing, and reporting
psychological studies: A checklist to avoid P-hacking. Frontiers in
Psychology 7, Nov (2016). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01832
[78] Ilan Yaniv and Dean P Foster. 1995. Graininess of Judgment Under
Uncertainty: An Accuracy-Informativeness Trade-Off. Journal of Ex-
perimental Psychology: General 124, 4 (1995), 424–432.
[79] Ilan Yaniv and Dean P. Foster. 1997. Precision and Accuracy of Judg-
mental Estimation. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 10 (1997),
21–32.
